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Abstract
　This paper discusses the deployment of American-style management and production sys-
tems in Germany after World War Ⅱ. The major issues are industrial engineering （IE） 
and the Ford system. We ﬁrst consider the deployment of IE, and then examine the de-
ployment of the Ford system. We analyze these issues in relation to German environmental 
factors such as labor relations, management values and traditions, and the market struc-
ture in Germany and Europe. The primary issue was the implementation of the work fac-
tor method and Methods Time Measurement （MTM） for the deployment of IE. We further 
examine the deployment of the Ford system, the rollout of the mass production system, 
and German manufacturing on the basis of German and European market characteristics.
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Ⅰ　Research Problems
　As other European countries and Japan did after World War Ⅱ , Germany deveoped en-
terprises, industries, and its economy by deploying and adapting technology and manage-
ment methods from the United States. American management methods were introduced 
and implemented under the US-led Productivity Movement. The major American manage-
ment methods implemented in these countries were ⑴ management and production sys-
tems （Industrial Engineering, Statistical Quality Control, Human Relations, and Ford Sys-
tem）, ⑵ management education, ⑶ methods for adjusting to a mass market （Marketing, 
Public Relations, and Operations Research） and ⑷ divisional structure.
　Introduction of the American management system post WWII constituted a fundamental 
condition for the development of full-scale mass production. Eventually in the 1950s and 
1960s, the mass production system was established in Germany. Among American manage-
ment and production systems, IE is an advanced form of scientiﬁc management that origi-
nated in America and gained broad acceptance after World War II. The Ford system was 
implemented in Germany even before the war and became commonplace afterward. This 
not only enabled mass production within the processing and assembly industries, but also 
became the basis for the post-war mass production system.
　However, these changes included the adaptations of systems to local conditions based on 
an overall structure of and relationship with German capitalism in business management. 
How business management in Germany changed with the deployment of US technology 
and management methods ? Along with commonalities with the US, what types of unique 
developments emerged ? How were US management methods reformed to accommodate 
German conditions ? And how were the German management style and characteristics cre-
ated ? What was the signiﬁcance of these developments ? In this paper, we will describe 
how American-style management systems were implemented in Germany and the resulting 
changes in corporate management. In regard to the deployment of the Ford system, we 
will examine the rollout of the mass production system, and German manufacturing on the 
basis of German and European market characteristics.
　Many studies approach this theme from the perspective of economic and business histo-
ries
1）
. However, these studies do not always identify which elements of American and Ger-
man management methods were combined, how they were hybridized, and which factors 
determined the hybridization. It is very important to elucidate how German-style business 
management and its particular characteristics, conforming to European conditions while still 
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bearing on the German management style, surfaced during the deployment of the Ameri-
can management method from the perspective of structural analysis. We will consider the 
problems from the author’s original framework.
　In Section Ⅱ , we will ﬁrst attempt to elucidate an analytical framework. Next, in Sec-
tion Ⅲ , we consider the deployment of American IE methods and then study the deploy-
ment of the Ford system and the resulting production system reforms, along with its rela-
tionship to German-style manufacturing in Section Ⅳ.
Ⅱ　Deployment of American Management Methods and “Re-framing”
― Analytical Framework―
　We will ﬁrst attempt to explain an analytical framework. The author establishes the idea 
of “re-framing,” using which we analyze the various problems in deploying American man-
agement methods that created conditions that facilitated business management changes in 
the postwar era.
　Re-framing, that is, the framework for analyzing various problems with the deployment 
of US management methods is explained below. Re-framing in this text refers to business 
management methods and systems that are deﬁned by structural characteristics of a coun-
try’s capitalism and how these are adapted, modiﬁed, and made compatible with the struc-
tural characteristics of capitalism in a country to which it is transferred. Among these, 
structural characteristics of this capitalism are related to the state of existence of the fol-
lowing items : a structure of productive forces, industrial structures, and market structures
― these three characteristics of Germany are deeply connected to re-framing. In addition, 
management values, business management traditions, and cultural factors and deﬁnability 
from an institutional perspective are also closely related to re-framing.
　Among the structure of productive forces, industrial structures, and market structures, 
regarding the structure of commodity markets, a country’s domestic market and export 
market characteristics, along with its regional and product compositions, are matters of 
market structure. These issues are closely related to price and quality competition and 
other competitive structures in a market. Thus, management methods must be developed 
according to diﬀerences in market structure. Labor markets are related to a country’s reg-
ulatory mechanisms, the state of labor relations, and the system of worker participation in 
management. Financial markets are connected with market involvement in the credit busi-
ness and securities market, their composition, and the system of ﬁnancial institutions. In in-
dustrial structures, characteristics of industrial development and international competition 
are important issues, as are the structure of productive forces, adapted to market and in-
dustrial structures, and the characteristics of the structure of productive forces, reﬂected 
in the development process. Characteristics of the structure of productive forces are, to a 
certain extent, connected to systems of specialized skills and vocational education, and ex-
ert a tremendous inﬂuence on the deployment of foreign elements of productive forces and 
the state of labor utilization.
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　These various elements that comprise the structural characteristics of a country’s capital-
ism are closely related to management values and business management traditions, culture, 
and systems. Business management traditions and culture interrelated with business man-
agement standards and values. Even regarding capitalism, wherein the pursuit of proﬁt is 
the greatest goal, a country’s corporate standards and values do not necessarily match 
those of other countries. For example, the US has traditionally emphasized standards and 
values based on pragmatism, and both the US and UK have placed signiﬁcant importance 
on obtaining ﬁnancial proﬁt through interest-bearing capital ; in contrast, the countries of 
continental Europe and Japan do not necessarily consider these their top priorities. Deci-
sions on where to place value, that is, production, technology, quality, or marketing policies, 
which are more directly tied to proﬁt, speciﬁcally short-term proﬁt, greatly aﬀect corporate 
behavior. However, management values and business management culture are not simply 
matters of general culture, but have deep connections with the structural characteristics of 
target markets identiﬁed by corporations. For example, if the commodity market in a cer-
tain country or region prioritizes product quality or functionality, corporations will focus on 
values and diﬀerentiation in technology or production because management values conform 
to market characteristics. Thus, market characteristics are closely related to management 
standards and values regarded important by corporations.
　Institutional factors include legal systems comprising all types of regulations ; labor rela-
tions ; educational systems ; and system for specialized skills. Labor relations deﬁne business 
management characteristics, such as investment in labor education based on labor condi-
tions and employment security systems, corporate product and market strategies based on 
these investments, and production and management systems adapted to these strategies. A 
country’s educational system is closely related with the cultivation of executives and man-
agers and that of skilled workers. In addition, production systems also inﬂuence manage-
ment standards and values. In discussions regarding varieties of capitalism, a country’s pro-
duction regime is deeply connected to institutional factors, the complementarity of 
education and training systems, labor market regulations and corporate governance, ﬁnan-
cial systems, and inter-ﬁrm relationships from the perspective of market competition and 
technology transfer
2）
. As a result, when a country’s production systems and management 
methods that supported these systems are deployed in other countries, these institutional 
factors often inﬂuence the re-framing of management methods.
　This concept of re-framing emphasizes the conditionality of structural characteristics tied 
to reproduction mechanisms of capitalism, particularly in the country where management 
methods and systems are created and that to which they are transferred and deployed. 
The management methods and systems of the originating country are adapted and modi-
ﬁed to the capitalist structure of the country to which they are transferred. In addition, as 
these methods and systems begin to function, their circumstances deﬁne the structure and 
characteristics of capitalism and the aspects of reproduction structure in that country. Re-
framing, in this text, focuses on problems that occur when the social system in an organi-
zation, speciﬁcally a corporation, is transferred to another country. Thus, the receiving na-
（　　）
271Deployment of Industrial Engineering and the Ford System in Germany after World War Ⅱ（Yamazaki）
865
tion’s capitalistic characteristics are amended or modiﬁed to an adaptable form when the 
originating country’s management methods, created for its own capitalistic structural char-
acteristics, are introduced and spread throughout a foreign country using that country’s 
methods. Accordingly, re-framing is the process of structural adaptation in response to dif-
ferent environmental conditions and a method of structural analysis, whereby the overall 
structure of business management is foundational.
Ⅲ　Deployment of Industrial Engineering in Germany
１　Development and Impact of Industrial Engineering
　As we next look at IE, we see that work studies consider it the next level of develop-
ment
3）
, and that the US had a decisively leading role in the IE ﬁeld. A Siemens US study 
trip report in 1963, the end of the productivity movement, noted that the predetermined 
time method then being implemented in the world of capitalism was without exception de-
veloped and tested in the US prior to being made public. For example, WF （work factor） 
was developed in the US in the mid-1930s
4）
, implemented after 1938, and then used interna-
tionally from 1952. In the International Management Conference held in September 1963, 
there was a discussion on issues of WF time standards and WF use
5）
. MTM （methods time 
measurement） was developed by H. B. Maynard, G. J. Stegemerten, and J. L. Schwab in 
the 1940s at Westinghouse
6）
, and spread after the war.
　Even in Germany, according to a 1948 source, manufacturers began to place great signiﬁ-
cance on work study
7）
. For example, electrical manufacturer AEG noted that from the 1950s 
to the 1960s, the rationalization of work and time studies played an important role in pro-
ductivity improvement
8）
. However, by the mid-1950s, the German organization REFA’s activi-
ties and wage payment methods were becoming prominent
9）
. For example, in a March 1956 
survey of 2,655 corporations conducted by Ifo, REFA systems accounted for as much as 




　However, the situation changed by the latter half of the 1950s. The increasing impor-
tance of work and time studies, along with the further development of REFA’s methods, is 
particularly apparent in the US predetermined time method. Even in West Germany, use 
of such methods expanded greatly by the end of the 1950s
11）
, and REFA was instrumental in 
its deployment. In the early 1960s, REFA was at the IE expansion stage, and had translat-
ed a US handbook into German
12）
. Upon publication of this translated IE Handbook, the ﬁrst 
education course in this ﬁeld was conducted using improved teaching methods
13）
. However, 
by around 1960, the original industrial engineering training had been around for quite some 
time in Anglo-Saxon countries, and in West Germany the opportunity to receive training in 




　IE training began to signiﬁcantly increase in the 1960s. The structure of training events 
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fundamentally changed in 1969, with IE courses comprising 24.7% of all education courses
15）
. 
In addition, the number of work study personnel trained in WF and MTM had risen to 
2,491 by 1966
16）
. There were a total of 52 IE seminars by the mid-1973, and about half of 
the candidates who completed the course were in IE positions, with the remainder being 
managers responsible for production control or business management, heads of labor sci-
ence departments, or their assistants
17）
. Regarding IE materials and books, 1967 saw the pub-
lication of a companion volume to the IE Handbook, thereby completing the REFA stan-
dard works for engineer training. Further, as REFA’s third original report, a magazine was 
published for work studies and IE managers
18）
, and from 1971 onward, Industrial Engineering 
Magazine was published on a bi-monthly basis
19）
.
　Responding to wages and cost pressures was an issue in the spread of IE in the mid-
1950s when Germany was at full employment. Because of this issue, the predetermined 
time method was implemented primarily for labor eﬃciency （in job design）. However, the 
overall spread of the predetermined time method was generally ﬁrst considered successful 
during the downturn of 1966/67 and its subsequent easing of the tight labor market
20）
. We 
will now examine the deployment of WF and MTM in detail.
２　Deployment of Work Factor Method 
　WF deployment was accomplished with the cooperation of US corporations and through 
licensing methods. REFA assisted in the deployment and spread of predetermined time 
methods such as WF
21）
. On February 1, 1958, REFA and the Work-Factor Company signed 
an agreement on implementing WF training courses in West Berlin and West Germany
22）
. 
The Work- Factor Company was a technical consulting organization that provided global 
IE services to economic and industrial institutions
23）
. After extensive research into number 
systems （MTM, WF, BMT, DMT, etc.）, the REFA Institute for Labor Science became a li-
censee of the Work- Factor Company
24）
. REFA also acquired the rights to translate the 
Work Factor Handbook and the rights to use the German translation which was based on 
the Dutch company, Philips. The second WF training course held in September 1958 was 
conducted by two people from Philips under contract with the Work-Factor Company, and 
Philips was heavily involved
25）
. However, the situation changed greatly in the 1960s ; by 1964, 
REFA instructors were using the original German training materials
26）
. Other corporations, 




　At the beginning of the 1960s, as the productivity movement was drawing to a close, job 
design was becoming more important than standard time settings because of the rapid on-
set of mechanization
28）
. REFA regarded WF as an appropriate tool for job design
29）
, and the fo-
cus of its activities shifted increasingly away from predetermined time methods toward job 
design in the latter half of the 1950s. In this manner, the signiﬁcance of motion study in-
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３　Deployment of MTM
　Study trips under the auspices of the US Technical Assistance Plan played an important 
role in the study and deployment of MTM methods, to which REFA also greatly contrib-
uted
31）
. Many of REFA’s regional branches saw the possibility of providing information on 
US time study systems
32）
.
　According to a source in 1963, MTM saw its greatest usage in the US but was also 
spreading in Germany
33）
, primarily being taught and spread by foreign consulting engineers. 
In comparison with WF, MTM had a more long-term, subdued role ; however, in 1963, com-
panies that had executed it formed the German MTM Association
34）
. The greatest impedi-
ment to European worker productivity, other than the delay in mass production and large-
scale lot production, was supposedly job design and work ﬂow, which was far weaker than 
in the US. The German MTM Association accepted the US predetermined time method in 
1964/65, adapted it to German circumstances, and disseminated it throughout Germany
35）
.
　The German MTM Association’s membership grew 2.6 times, from 115 corporations in 
1966 to approximately 300 in 1973. The employees of these member companies more than 
quadrupled, from roughly 500,000 to 2,000,000. More than half of these member compa-
nies were in the precision equipment （30% in 1974） and metal processing （23% in 1974） 
industries, and other industries included clothing （14%）, steel （4%）, chemical （4%）, service 
and banking （5%） industries
36）
. In many cases, activities sponsored by organizations such as 
the German MTM Association were made possible with the cooperation of corporations 
and similar organizations in the US. The new US motion and time study methods were of-
ten implemented in Germany through private US companies
37）
.
４　Deployment of the Work Factor Method and MTM in Major Industrial Sectors
　Looking next at major industrial sectors, IE methodologies were ﬁrst deployed in various 
areas within mass production management, but the primary focus was the electrical and 
automotive industries. At Bosch, a transition to WF methods began in the mid-1950s, but 
in 1960 the decision was made to use MTM, and work councils and company management 
signed a shop agreement. MTM deployment had special priority in the production depart-
ment, and was afterward expanded for the ﬁrst time, though on a smaller scale, to the 
maintenance and control departments
38）
. Daimler-Benz also used MTM from the 1960s on-
ward. Although in retrospect, there were but a few cases of MTM being used at Daimler-
Benz, in the German automotive industry in general or even in various departments within 
the electrical industry, MTM proved to be the best tool for job design and time economics
39）
.
　A 1965 IG Metall report states that WF, MTM, and other predetermined time methods 
were gaining popularity in the metals industry. For example, corporations in the steel in-
dustry were systematically moving toward the streamlining of maintenance and repair de-
partments using predetermined time methods based on the deployment of wage incentive 
systems. The shipbuilding industry also increased its usage of predetermined time methods
40）
. 
Deployment of predetermined time methods in maintenance tasks could also be seen in the 
chemical and mining industries
41）
. A 1969 report noted that usage of IE methods were not 
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limited to the machinery or transportation equipment industries, but was spreading to steel 
and metals, clothing, construction, chemicals, and even service industries
42）
. For example, 
MTM was being used in the sewing industry by the 1950s
43）
, and all sorts of MTM-based 
data systems could be used to locate time data within the clothing and machinery indus-
tries
44）
. To German industries, IE was an important element in creating satisfactory manage-
ment results and competitive advantage
45）
.
　In the electrical industry, WF attracted attention at the end of the 1950s at Siemens as 
an aid to job design planners and production equipment designers, and both WF and 
MTM were the most well-known work study methods
46）
. Siemens implemented approximately 
15 WF information education courses by 1962, and in addition to sponsoring many semi-
nars for supervisors and specialists had roughly 100 WF-trained workers in their factories. 
The largest portion of these trained personnel worked in production preparation and work 
planning departments for large-lot and mass production. The Siemens Work Factor Group 
comprising nine members from three Siemens companies was formed, and the results of 
their work were tested and then conveyed to the REFA Institute, after which they could 
be adopted by any company that had WF-trained personnel
47）
. An “IE Theory and Practice 
in the US”-themed study group participated in a US IE Institute international conference 
and a WF international conference, and visited Westinghouse, Bell and Howell, Teletype, 
and the Work-Factor Company. Siemens’ WF instructors were instrumental in providing 
guidance in the preparation of Germany’s public WF manual. By April 1964, a total of 
615 people had participated in 35 WF training courses held in West Germany. Twelve of 
these courses were taught internally for Siemens’ organizations, and Siemens had approxi-
mately 150 trained WF personnel. In two particular teacher training courses, there were 31 
REFA instructors qualiﬁed to teach, of which eight were Siemens employees. At the time, 
27 major corporations, such as Siemens, AEG, Olympia, and Zeiss, were formally using WF, 
and it was becoming clear that it would be necessary to adapt WF to the overall situation 
in Germany as well as to the special environment within Siemens. To that end, Siemens 
formed a team of specialists experienced in WF. This study group was conscious of the 
need to modify WF for a number of reasons, and they applied Siemens’ scientiﬁc human 
engineering research not only to psychological eﬀects but also to speciﬁc operations. This 
same group published a companion volume to the internal Siemens manual so that WF 
could be uniformly used across Siemens organizations
48）




　Within the chemical industry, Glanzstoﬀ decided to deploy WF in the REFA Institute 
training courses, and both four-week basic and one-week information training courses were 
held
50）
. WF specialists from US consulting ﬁrms conducted practical work and research stud-
ies as part of the WF deployment. As a result of a detailed examination of both WF and 
MTM methods, Glanzstoﬀ pressed ahead in using the WF method
51）
. A 1962 document by 
Glanzstoﬀ’s rationalization department showed that predetermined time methods such as 
WF and MTM were excellent ways to make systematic improvements
52）
. Time units of less 
than 1/1000 （.06 seconds） became the elements of work analysis through ﬁlm and prede-
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termined time methods （WF and MTM）. This was one reason BASF chose to compare re-
sults from various time measurement devices using test ﬁlm and high-speed camera pho-
tography, and to compare predetermined lengths of time as well
53）
. Deployment, however, 
varied by company, and Henkel, for example, used methods like IE to a very limited ex-
tent, even in the latter half of the 1960s
54）
.
　With new methods such as IE, predetermined time methods were not negotiated be-
tween workers and those making time measurements as done in the REFA methods ; in-
stead, the usage and modiﬁcations of performance measurements were negotiated between 
management and work councils that represented workers, or between management and la-
bor unions
55）
. There was a great deal of opposition to certain aspects of the predetermined 
time method, but the fact that labor unions did not oppose them in principle made it much 
easier for corporations to implement
56）
.
５　Characteristics of Industrial Engineering Deployment in Germany
　Next, let us look at characteristics of the German IE deployment. Within IE, American 
methods like WF and MTM were promoted based on REFA’s strong involvement, along 
with the cooperation of the Work-Factor Company, the German MTM Association, consul-
tants, and others. Between the late 1950s and the ﬁrst half of the 1960s, US superiority in 




　However, REFA had traditionally played an important role in Germany since the ratio-
nalization movement of the 1920s. K. Schlaich notes that, from an operational perspective, it 
is only natural that the spread of IE is mainly attributed to REFA
58）
. A 1960 Hämmerling 
report noted that there were certainly eﬀorts to reduce production times through a partial 
adoption of new methods such as MTM and WF based on US practice, but these methods 
would not have succeeded without their incorporation into REFA’s methods
59）
. A 1975 
Schwartzman report noted that the German industry had built work studies based on 
REFA thinking over the last several decades
60）
. Thus, we see that the dissemination of IE 
was related to REFA activities, and was also greatly aﬀected by US-based IE.
　REFA had researched and examined various predetermined time methods including 
MTM and WF for a long time, and as a result decided to support WF, obtaining a license 
to use and disseminate the method
61）
. However, REFA did not, for the most part, deprioritize 
its own systems in promoting WF. As a result, these US methods were not widely adopted 
in German industry, unlike countries such as Sweden, where the creator of MTM, H.B. 




　Procuring training and deployment routes for IE methodologies, like the agreement with 
Work-Factor Company or the use of consulting ﬁrms, provided characteristically greater 
opportunities for the deployment of American-style methods, unlike other management 
methods. An additional important characteristic was that German organizations played a 
major part, as can be seen in the eﬀorts and roles of REFA and the German MTM Asso-
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ciation. However, the deployment and dissemination of American-style methods continued 
with the help of REFA’s leadership in work studies and their activities in the 1920s, along 
with the attempts to apply these methods to German circumstances under REFA’s strong 
inﬂuence.
Ⅳ　German Rollout of the Ford System and German Manufacturing
　Next, let us look at the issues of production system innovation via deployment of the 
Ford system and German-style manufacturing. The US form of mass production was new 
to Europe in the 1950s
63）
. In the automotive industry, which was the most pivotal, until the 
1940s, the types of production organizations were deﬁnitively regulated by the markets it 
supplied. It has been noted that as long as that was the case, Americanism would only 
spread on a selective basis
64）
. In contrast, postwar market changes brought mass motoriza-
tion, which enabled full-scale deployment of the Ford system.
１　General Conditions in the Postwar Deployment of the Ford System
　First, let us examine the overall circumstances at the time of the Ford system deploy-
ment. Deployment occurred in processing and assembly industries such as the automotive 
and electrical industries （but particularly in ﬁnal assembly of primary product lines such 
as radios, televisions, vacuum cleaners, washing machines, dishwashers, and electric rang-
es
65）
）. In 1953, there were very few production ﬁelds that could economically use production 
lines based on American-style methods because of changes to product and component de-
sign and structure as well as ﬂuctuations in production volume
66）
. A 1956 report mentioned 
that ﬂow production was still in its initial stages
67）
, but this situation changed in a major 
way in the latter half of the 1950s. For example, a 1958 report noted that the principles of 
ﬂow production had become much more widespread and had completely eliminated the 
principle of organization by machine type
68）
. K. Springer also stated in 1963 that the need for 
rationalization increasingly led to production via work ﬂow in manufacturing industries
69）
.
　The automotive industry was the most typical sector in which American-style methods 
were deployed, and the end of the 1950s saw a continuous transition away from smaller 
cars toward mid-sized vehicles in Germany
70）
. The deployment of the Ford system was a re-
sponse to this trend, and the industry-wide switch to Fordism accelerated during the last 
third of the 1950s
71）
. One focus of the automotive industry eﬀort to rationalize in the 1950s 
and 1960s was a large-scale production revolution using conveyor belt technology in the 
body production, unit assembly, and ﬁnal assembly departments
72）
. For example, according to 
a 1963 report, in many cases manual work dominated assembly, despite the high standards 
already being achieved by machines and automation in cutting and machining of processed 
parts
73）
. Thus, the rollout of the ﬂow production system and its synchronization of overall as-
sembly processes were particularly meaningful.
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２　 Deployment of the Ford System and Rollout of Mass Production Sytems in the 
Automotive Industry
　Here, we will review case studies of corporations in the automotive industry. These cor-
porations are prime examples in which Ford system deployment was most dominant.
⑴　Volkswagen Case Study
　Let us ﬁrst look at Volkswagen. Volkswagen was the trendsetter in accepting Ford pro-
duction methods and in the formation of corresponding labor relations
74）
. In 1946, immediately 
after the war ended, a number of assembly and ﬁnal assembly conveyors were already in 
operation for transmissions, axles, and engines, producing approximately 1,000―1,200 auto-
mobiles per month
75）
. After 1954, Volkswagen worked on technical reshuﬄing, one objective 
being the creation of an external force for the work rhythm using Takt time （Eﬀective 
working time in a period ÷ Demand in a period） of machines and conveyors. The time 
required for each process was calculated and set as a standard time for workers. This 
technical reshuﬄing in the Wolfsburg plant forced the labor organization to adapt from the 
outset and fall in line with the US model
76）
. The conveyor assembly line that began operat-
ing in 1946 produced only one model, the Beetle, and by the beginning of the 1960s, a per-
fect ﬂow had been built for coordinated mass production
77）
. In the summer of 1961, two new 




　In the new delivery van factory operating in Hanover in 1956, ﬁnal assembly used a con-
veyor belt as well. Production was organized by deploying many new mechanized or par-
tially automated routings to individual lines that fed the ﬁnal assembly. Assembly using 
fully mechanized conveyor belts was typical, and the widespread use of conveyor belts was 
characteristic of the production technology of this plant. Body production conveyors were 
synchronized with body panel production, and these production methods reduced work 
time by 25% compared with stationary assembly
79）
.
　For the deployment of special-purpose machinery and automation technology, which was 
important in the expansion of Ford system type mass production methods, H. Nordhoﬀ 
sought a “perfect new direction” by the spring of 1954. Automation of body frame produc-
tion as well as painting and plating areas was already well underway. In contrast, press 
plants and machining departments were striving to gradually eliminate or drastically re-
duce manual work
80）
. In 1955, automation eﬀorts expanded, and the company made large in-
vestments in special-purpose machine tools and general automation as they replaced old 
multipurpose tools. The company’s continuous ﬂow production was developed by connect-
ing the stages of individual routings through the transfer machines of many work spaces. 
In all cases where planning of the production volume without frequent design and struc-
ture coordination was possible, multipurpose machinery was replaced by ﬂexible special-
purpose machinery. This type of automation was deployed early on in the production of 
the Beetle economy car
81）
.
　Technical aspects of Volkswagen’s automation concentrated on two aspects : combining 
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individual processing stages using production lines and more powerful use of special-pur-
pose machinery
82）
. However, by the end of the 1950s, despite Volkswagen possessing the 
most modern equipment among West German corporations
83）
, manufacturing processes were 
automated very cautiously until the company was sure that markets could absorb the pro-
duction increases that the additional automation enabled. This kind of corporate behavior 
resulted from operating in product markets and factor supply conditions that were clearly 
diﬀerent from those of the US
84）
. However, the 1960s saw a more intense expansion in the 
automotive market, and a full-scale deployment of American-style automation technology 
was attempted. For example, the 1963 annual report of the “Purchasing and Materials Man-
agement Department” for the board of directors mentioned the approval of many orders 
for presses, equipment, and transfer machines in the Kasel and Hanover plants
85）
. In 1964 at 
the Wolfsburg plant, new transfer machines for automated assembly of the 1200 and 1300 
Beetles were in operation
86）
.
　In the deployment of these kinds of production technology innovations within Volkswa-
gen, C. Kleinschmidt maintains that with the exception of companies such as Ford and 
Opel, Volkswagen is the only German automotive manufacturer capable of putting the 
American model to use over the course of decades. Volkswagen became strongly aligned 
with the American model, particularly Ford’s River Rouge plant, and in the 1950s, the US 
played a decisive role in Volkswagen’s success
87）
. 
　In reality however, one secret of Volkswagen’s success was their selective approach to 
the American model. While Volkswagen followed the US expansion, they used specialized 
know-how such as highly mechanized proprietary transfer machines for body assembly, 
and could thus relax their very strict alignment with US development
88）
. One way Volkswa-
gen pursued a German approach to production technology innovation was to replace the 
US style of automation called “Detroit automation,” which impeded ﬂexible production 
methods, with one adapted to German circumstances. As a follower, Volkswagen was able 
to learn from others’ mistakes and avoid the diﬃculties ﬁrst-moves had experienced in the 
automation process. In this manner, a new type of typical German Fordism was born, en-
abling Volkswagen to survive the decline of the 1970s through this application of American 
methods to German circumstances. The essence of this method could be seen in the di-
verse, high quality production that dominated the country in concert with German-style la-
bor relations that were critical to codetermination. This system of harmonious labor rela-
tions based on labor resource cooperation in distributing shop ﬂoor power between labor 
and management is said to reﬂect the essential elements of a classic paradigm of highly 




　We will net consider Opel’s case. K40, Opel’s new, large scale body and assembly plants 
were in full operation by August 1956, and the company was working on production sys-
tem innovations. Two basic chassis types, for 1.5-liter and 2.5-liter engine vehicles, were 
separately assembled on two conveyors within body assembly, and these merged onto one 
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conveyor to produce white bodies. After undercoating, painting, and interior installation, 
completed bodies were sent via conveyor to ﬁnal assembly, where engines and chassis also 
moved on conveyors. Two thirds of the main assembly conveyors comprised overhead 
chain conveyors whose height could be adjusted based on the work being performed
90）
. A 
1957 report mentions that only one 6,500 meter long main conveyor remained in the new 
Rüsselsheim plant for body manufacturing, where all six types of vehicles were produced. 
Production using large belt conveyors can be performed in two ways : continuous produc-
tion using larger volumes of the same model or a mixed production environment for all 
models based on the assembly plan. Opel chose the latter method because of long work 
times that varied by model, and also because they could eﬀectively use tools set up along 
the conveyor belt
91）
. The combined length of the plant’s conveyor belts and assembly con-
veyors amounted to 28,000 meters. To manage the assembly of all models other than 
trucks on the same conveyor, a teletype system was created, making the plant one of the 
world’s most modern automotive plants
92）
.
　The Bochum plant began production in 1962. The Number 2 plant produced engines and 
chassis parts, with engine assembly being done using conveyors as well. The Number 1 
plant produced bodies and performed ﬁnal assembly using overheard chain conveyors, as-
sembly conveyors, and other transportation equipment that totaled 31 kilometers in length 
over 227 pieces of equipment. The length of conveyor belts and assembly conveyors in the 
Number 2 plant was 11 kilometers. Bodies, pre-assembled chassis units, and engines con-
verged on ﬁnal assembly conveyors
93）
.
　Opel primarily manufactured small cars and economy vehicles, and they put great eﬀort 
into deploying the Ford system. In 1962, Opel noted that conveyor belts were being used 
for mass production, with one automobile rolling oﬀ the line every 50 seconds
94）
.
　In reviewing the deployment of special-purpose machinery and automation technology, 
we see that transfer machines and other automation equipment were implemented for 
crankshaft production in machining departments in the mid-1950s
95）
. According to one source 
in 1956, a characteristic of this period’s production was the addition to the work ﬂow of 
numerous pieces of equipment that could also monitor and control the work, rather than 
simply automating it
96）
. At the end of 1958, a new, large investment project was begun, and 
the pace of investment accelerated
97）
. Around this time, Opel began using cylinder piston 
lines along with many general transfer machines, a phenomenon unique to this plant
98）
.
　The Rüsselsheim plant began production using new equipment for engines and transmis-
sions in August 1961. At the time, the plant had 55 transfer machines, 70 multi-axis lathes, 
and 1,175 individual pieces of machine tools
99）
. In 1962, the Bochum plant began production 
of engines, transmissions, axles, cardan shafts, and other components using 1,147 individual 
machine tools. The standard of technology was high, with much of the equipment being 
the 47 transfer machines used to process cylinder blocks, crankshafts, connecting rods, 
gearboxes, and the like
100）
. Opel also stated in their 1962 corporate history that they had be-
gun using transfer machines to automatically transport all work-in-process inventory
101）
.
　When transferring production systems to a subsidiary of an American company, as was 
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the case with Opel and Ford, it was sometimes necessary to know and understand subsid-
iary production system dynamics not present in the parent company. Even in cases where 
the subsidiary was most receptive, this transfer required innovation and ﬂexibility
102）
. This is-
sue also relates to the adaptation of methodologies to the conditions in postwar Germany. 
There was sometimes a huge gap between the potential power of GM and Ford’s methods 
and the ability to eﬀectively apply them. In Germany, Volkswagen serves as the best ex-





　Our next subject is Daimler-Benz. In 1950, Daimler-Benz had begun work on production 
lines for the 220 and 300 model automobiles. The 220 model was produced using conveyor 
belts beginning in the fall of 1951, and the 300 model moved to mass production, although 
slowly at ﬁrst, beginning in November 1951
104）
. After the war, the Sindelﬁngen plant began ﬁ-
nal assembly work in addition to body production
105）
. In the ﬁscal year 1957, the company in-
vested in production methods that would lower costs
106）
 and worked on improving production 
methods for mass production along with complete process modernization.
　However, even in the ﬁrst half of the 1960s, there was a serious gap in productivity be-
tween Daimler-Benz and US corporations. In the US, Ford produced a maximum of 2,500 
cars per day, while Daimler-Benz required 17 manufacturing hours to assemble even the 
smallest passenger car. The high production capacity of US factories’ was due to the com-
plete mechanization of transportation using conveyors and conveyor belts. One important 
way to create economies of scale was the response by standardization based on “unit sys-
tem” principles that enabled both model variety and economically proﬁtable volumes. Daim-
ler-Benz implemented standardized mass production by using the unit system and cutting 
back on certain models in both the passenger and commercial vehicle departments
107）
.
　The applicability of standardized production factors based on unit system principles and 
the integration work that increases their applicability were very important. In Daimler’s 
case, when considering production methods from a work organization perspective, it ap-
peared to be nothing more than an organized ﬂow of work as would be found in the US. 
However, the skills within the key production elements between design and production 
were signiﬁcant. Thus, emphasis was placed on the development of high quality production 
that encompassed labor process ﬂexibility based on Daimler-Benz’s reliance on skilled labor.
　In examining the deployment of special-purpose machinery and automation, an August 
1958 survey noted that production volumes were low at the Untertürkheim plant, and that 
its equipment were far from meeting the highest standards of modernization
108）
. An annual 
report on that plant in 1959 reported that there were limits to further automation for larg-
er-scale production because of the diverse models being produced
109）
. This factor alone dem-
onstrates that standardization critical in deploying the latest technology, and in the 1960s it 
became an even more important issue. Deployment of automation technology began in ear-
nest in the 1960s at Daimler-Benz. For example, investment for transfer machines in the 
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Untertürkheim plant numbered 4 in 1961, 13 in 1962, 1 in 1963, 7 in 1965, 1 in 1966, 10 in 
1967, and 5 in 1970. The deployment scope was not limited to engine production, but ex-
panded to axles, transmissions, oil pans, bracing tubes, and other systems
110）
. An annual re-
port on the Untertürkheim plant listed machines and their years of use, but reports after 
1959 provided a simple average of machines by year of purchase and did not accurately 
reﬂect the aging of equipment because of the deployment of special-purpose machinery and 
the increase of high-performance transfer machines for many machining processes
111）
.
　Corporations such as Daimler-Benz that were pursuing a product strategy emphasizing 
upper-class market segments sought a German production model while deploying Ameri-
can-style mass production technologies and systems. Speciﬁcally, to ensure high quality and 
to diﬀerentiate themselves in the marketplace, Daimler-Benz relied on high quality, skilled 
labor that complemented the standards created by technical equipment, and integration of 
production factors within the unit system as they rolled out a system for diverse, high-
quality production. In this context, it could be said that they chose to Germanize the model 
in a diﬀerent way than did Volkswagen.
３　The Rollout of Mass Production Systems and German Manufacturing
　As these examples demonstrate, postwar Germany’s deployment of mass production sys-
tems such as the Ford system centered on typical volume production industries like the 
automotive and electrical industries. Overall, changes in production during the 1950s were 
not simply a “rebuilding” of the prewar state, as they also became more ﬂexible and dy-
namic. It has been stated before that rationalization along the lines of Taylor-Ford using an 
American-style mass production model was integrated with the management climate of the 
1950s and modiﬁed based on collective experience
112）
. On this point, A. Ambrosius identiﬁes 
two important factors in the failure of the Taylor-Ford model of rationalization in quickly 
spreading in 1950s West Germany : consumer goods production at the time was merely of 
supplementary signiﬁcance and German managers had a traditionally skeptical attitude to-
ward American-style Fordism. This not only has to do with the issue of the wide-scale 
management units necessary to roll out this type of rationalization model, but is also relat-
ed to the “Made in Germany” brand, combined with ﬂexible labor- and knowledge-intensive 
production methods instead of globally standardized mass production
113）
.
　Mass production did progress in Germany during the 1950s and 1960s, but even there it 
was limited to two types of companies. First are companies like Volkswagen with a corpo-
rate policy of producing aﬀordable cars for their broad customer base that pursue econo-
mies of scale through American-style mass production
114）
. In contrast, companies that had de-
veloped management and product strategies , which prioritized high-end market segments 
with outstanding quality and technology and considered the relatively low price-elasticity of 
upper segments in the market, occupied an important position but applied a diﬀerent strat-
egy
115）
. Companies like Daimler-Benz and BMW in particular implemented strategies to design 
products targeting market segments with high quality, value-added products based on a 
relatively long-term model policy. From the manufacturer’s perspective, their product de-
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sign concepts were based on their users’ functional needs of quality and durability, which 
were diﬀerent from the needs of US consumers.
　For example, in the 1950s, Daimler-Benz had a corporate philosophy anchored in two 
production concepts : manufacturing vehicles with a utility value created in response to the 
demands for uniqueness and luxury, and a broad and comprehensive supply for commer-
cial vehicles. This philosophy proved highly successful
116）
. Such product and production con-
cepts are related to the production model. According to W. Streeck, there were two types 
of auto manufacturers in postwar West Germany : mass production manufacturers in the 
north （Volkswagen, Ford, and Opel） and luxury car manufacturers, a remnant of craft pro-
duction, in the south （BMW, Daimler-Benz, and their competitors）. These regional diﬀer-
ences developed in response to diﬀerences in manufacturing principles and philosophies. 
Southern manufacturers had technical creativity and were engineering perfectionists
117）
. For 
these manufacturers, specializing in these particular market segments with a value-add 
strategy of high quality and high performance meant that there was little necessity for 
cost superiority through economies of scale
118）
. Strategies for product design concepts and 
market positioning greatly inﬂuenced the important characteristics of quality and ﬂexible 
production concept, an inherently German characteristic.
　This focus on “quality and a ﬂexible production concept” could be seen in prewar Ger-
many as one method of production responding to market limits
119）
. The basic principles of 
this same production concept could also be seen in postwar Germany. That is, one can 
identify German characteristics in production methods and systems based on product de-
sign concepts, such as avoiding price competition, positioning, and speciﬁc niche strategies 
in postwar international market expansion. Even though work organization itself was a 
ﬂow production system that may have been founded on a US model and although these 
corporations pursued economies of scale in mass production, the elements of high quality, 
knowledge-intensive production relying on skilled labor, and German-speciﬁc systems of vo-
cational education and specialist qualiﬁcations, such as the meister system, were quite sig-
niﬁcant. Germany had a production system based on technical qualiﬁcations and vocational 
education, and production management work in corporations was dominated by skilled en-
gineers. Thus, the skill level of production managers was very high. This was an important 
factor in the superiority of the design, development, production, and quality of German 
products
120）
. In Germany’s case, quality in the form of product functionality, durability, de-
pendability, and safety was heavily emphasized, as was reliance on expert, skilled labor in 
certain jobs. This model diﬀers from Japan’s, where integration emphasizing operational ca-
pability was a major source of competitive advantage
121）
. The distinct characteristics of Ger-
man-style manufacturing can be seen in production, which reﬂected product design con-
cepts emphasizing quality, function, and branding against the background of the European 
market’s competitiveness and factors of competitive advantage.
　In this context, despite the common perception of “Americanization,” important aspects 
of German characteristics in German production and manufacturing can be observed in the 
midst of the postwar American inﬂuence. However, these characteristics are deeply rooted 
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in market structures and diﬀered with those of the US, which had a highly standardized 
market. Because this phenomenon was born of the uniquely German and European market 
emphasis on quality and function, it is important to understand that the German produc-
tion and manufacturing model was a rational adaptation to the nature of these markets.
　The following table （see next page） visualizes the conditions surrounding the introduc-
tion of American IE methods and the Ford system as well as “re-framing” and the factors 
deﬁning it, based on the discussion so far in this paper.
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Management & Production Systems 
Industrial Engineering The Ford System
Overall Conditions in 
the Deployment of 
American Management 
Methods 
◦ Deployments focused on the Work-Factor 
Method and MTM
◦ Deployments focused on processing and 
assembly, steel and metal, chemical, ship-
building, and clothing industries
◦ The delay in the spread of IE relative to 
other countries
◦ Inter-industry and inter-corporate diﬀer-
ences in the selection of the Work-Factor 
Method and MTM
◦ Deployment of ﬂow production system 
mechanisms and production organization 
principles
Deployment Character-
istics of American 
Management Methods
◦ Strong involvement and leadership of the 
REFA （e.g., IE introduction, launch of ed-
ucation courses, etc.）
◦ REFA’s prioritization of their own system
◦ Deployments based on REFA’s license 
agreement with the Work-Factor Compa-
ny
◦ The establishment of the German MTM 
Association and its eﬀorts
◦ Diﬀerences in production systems among 
companies
◦ The development of diversiﬁed quality 
production based on skilled or specialized 
labor 
◦ Case of deployments of mixed-model as-
sembly line
Modiﬁcations in Amer-
i c an  Management 
Methods 
◦ Creation and development of work study 
based on REFA thinking despite the in-
ﬂuence of IE
◦ Case of the application of human engi-
neering research （Siemens） 
◦ The pursuit of economies of scale by 
using unit systems 
Ama l g ama t i o n  o f 
American and German 
Elements 
◦ Integration of IE methods into the REFA 
system
◦ Linking unique prewar production system 
elements in Germany
◦ Use of knowledge-intensive skills relying 
on skilled workers 
◦ Linking standardization systems through 
the unit system 
Factors of 
“Re-fram-






Cu l t u r a l 







◦ Traditional German adaptations through 
modiﬁcations of the Taylor system to 
REFA in the 1920s 
◦ Technology-, quality-, and functionality-
oriented management values
◦ Management values and manufacturing 
views based on understanding customer 
needs, rather than production perspec-
tives
◦ The tradition of prioritizing skilled engi-






◦ Systematic foundation of REFA eﬀorts in 
time and work studies
◦ Promotion of implementation and execu-
tion based on acceptable views by unions
◦ Case of implementation and execution 
through work agreements with work 
councils 
◦ Production systems with the foundation 
of the vocational education system and 




t o r s  o f 
the Struc-
t u r e  o f 
P r o d u c -
tive Forc-
es 
◦ The development of management through 
the REFA system since the prewar era 
◦ Pursuit of economies of scale based on 
lower production volumes since the pre-
war era and the development of produc-
tion systems that ensured production 
ﬂexibility
◦ Prewar tradition of ﬂexible quality pro-
duction
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